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Health Care Reform in Transition
Incremental Insurance Reform Without an Individual Mandate
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
Elenora E. Connors, JD, MPH

O

N JANUARY 20, 2010, SCOTT BROWN WON THE
Massachusetts Senate seat held by Edward
Kennedy for 46 years, ending the Democrats’
filibuster-proof supermajority and stalling health
care reform. Lawmakers in both parties called for bipartisan
health insurance protections to supplant the more comprehensive packages, which currently include an individual purchase mandate. Piecemeal reform could impose a tax on highcost plans, prohibit health status underwriting, require
continuation coverage for individuals younger than 25 years,
and fund state health insurance exchanges.1 Although incremental reform would provide some protection for vulnerable
individuals, it could have serious, unintended consequences.

Health Status Underwriting
Perhaps the most politically compelling incremental reform
would bar health status underwriting (ie, excluding or charging higher rates to unhealthy applicants). Nongroup and smallgroup health plans almost uniformly deny coverage or charge
exorbitant premiums to those with preexisting conditions—
when the patient receives a diagnosis or treatment for a serious illness before plan enrollment. Therefore, a major access
problem in the private insurance market is that individuals
with health conditions are either excluded from purchasing
coverage or have premiums priced so high they cannot afford it. In effect, individuals are denied coverage for exactly
what they need, which jeopardizes their health and the financial security of their family. Because of this dramatic exclusionary policy, requiring insurers to cover individuals with preexisting conditions (in some cases only for those ⬍19 years)
has strong bipartisan support.1
State high-risk pools operate in 34 states, offering health
insurance to residents with preexisting medical conditions
who cannot purchase affordable coverage. However, they
comprise only 2% of the individual market and with premiums averaging 125% to 200% of standard rates, coverage is unaffordable for many.2
Risk Pools and Rate Practices
In a well-functioning private market, health insurance spreads
the risk of individuals across a population to ensure that ev1188 JAMA, March 24/31, 2010—Vol 303, No. 12 (Reprinted)

eryone can afford medical care when he or she needs it. In
effect, the healthy subsidize the sick as part of a social contract, which recognizes that everyone may become ill one
day. In a good society, individuals should not want for health
insurance because they are already sick or too poor to afford coverage.
However, risk pools are functional only if they include
enough healthy individuals to keep overall health care
expenditures lower than premium costs so that high-cost
individuals will be covered. The larger the population in
the pool, the more predictable and stable premiums are
because the high cost of a few is spread out across many.
To ensure reasonably predictable and stable-expected
costs, insurers attempt to maintain risk pools of individuals with health similar to or better than that of the general
population.3
The extant individual health insurance market functions badly and, as a result, the poor and sick are functionally excluded. Individuals with high expected claims are often excluded or charged exorbitant premiums because if a
risk pool has too many individuals in poor health, the average cost increases and those who are healthy are less likely
to join. Adverse selection—whereby those with higherthan-average risk of needing health care are more likely to
seek insurance—results when multiple persons of poorerthan-average health enroll in the pool.3 Countries with social insurance or single-payer systems with a standard package of benefits do not encounter problems of adverse selection
because everyone, regardless of health status, is covered.
However, in the United States, adverse selection increases
the average risk in the insurance pool, thus driving up premiums.
Unintended Effects of Incremental Reform
Although providing greater access to health care is vitally
important, in practice requiring insurers to accept more highcost individuals without adding more healthy individuals
to the pool could result in adverse selection, increased costs,
and a potential financial death spiral.3 If insurers assign everyone the same rate (community rating), healthier indiAuthor Affiliations: O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC.
Corresponding Author: Lawrence O. Gostin, JD, Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey Ave NW, Washington, DC 20001 (gostin@law.georgetown
.edu).
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viduals will encounter an increase in premiums and may leave
the group. However, absent community rating, if insurers
adjust premiums based on the predicted costs of a group
(experience rating), individuals with poor health are priced
out of the market.
If there are no incentives or mandates for individuals who
are healthy to purchase insurance, risk pools will become
even more expensive, leading healthy individuals to leave
the market and resulting in even more adverse selection,
which forces insurers to continually raise premiums. This
cyclical effect is deemed the adverse selection death spiral,3 leading to malfunctioning markets.
Spreading the Risk—The Return of the Mandate
Congress sought to broaden risk pools through a national
individual purchase mandate. A tax penalty would be levied on individuals who do not have qualifying insurance
with acceptable minimum coverage through government
(eg, Medicaid and Medicare), employers, the private sector, or new health insurance exchanges. Mandates, of
course, are ineffective and unfair without adequate subsidies for poor individuals and families. Premium and costsharing subsidies for low-income individuals and
expanded Medicaid eligibility would facilitate affordable
coverage and are critically important for expanding access
to medical care.
A mandate counteracts adverse selection by bringing more
healthy individuals into the risk pool, thereby decreasing
premiums. Moreover, mandates decrease the number of uninsured, thereby lessening cost-shifting due to uncompensated care. Additional benefits include a decrease in “free
riders” or individuals who forgo private insurance believing they will stay healthy or care will be available in an emergency.4 Many cannot afford insurance, but others choose
not to purchase insurance because they are young and healthy
(eg, 9.7 million individuals earning ⬎$75 000 annually had
no coverage in 2008).5
Mandates, together with health status underwriting, prevent insurers from engaging in opportunistic marketing practices, such as selectively seeking young, healthy individuals while discouraging the sick and the elderly. Insurers
perceive these practices as benign business decisions necessary to overcome the “take up” problem of well-off individuals being unwilling to pay for risks that seem remote.4
However, these practices create enormous burdens for the
poor and the sick, and shift health care costs to the public
or charitable sectors.
Leading up to the Massachusetts election, conservatives
framed the mandate in terms of personal freedom, compulsory contracts, and transfer of money to a private party. Although nothing prevents states from implementing insurance purchase mandates (eg, Massachusetts), local lawmakers
threaten to challenge the federal government’s constitutional powers to do so. Key Senate Republicans have spo©2010 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

ken out against the mandate, all but guaranteeing it stays
off the table for the agreed-upon incremental reforms.
The goals of health reform are to increase access to quality affordable care, while reining in costs. Incremental reforms cannot achieve these goals. Preexisting condition coverage without a purchase mandate may benefit the sick, but
ultimately may make insurance even less affordable for everyone and particularly the least well-off. Funding for state
exchanges could increase access if states could keep costs
down while offering guaranteed benefits packages and subsidies. However, without insurer standards and a larger participating population, exchanges have often proven ineffective and expensive.6 Although President Obama’s proposed
discretionary spending on public programs, information technology, and health promotion is critical, it is not sufficient
to increase access and equity; and it will only marginally reduce costs.
Certainly, incremental reform has expanded public programs (eg, the Children’s Health Insurance Plan) and coverage continuation (Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). However, piecemeal changes have done
little to improve the small-group and individual market.7
Almost everyone agrees that the extant private market cannot ensure health care for all at an affordable cost. Comprehensive reform can bring improved health and security
to the population. If this goal must be accomplished the
“American way” through the private system, the simple logic
of insurance has to prevail, which is to spread the risk among
everyone—rich and poor, healthy and sick, young and old
alike.
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